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AN OVERVIEW OF FEMINIST TORTS
SCHOLARSHIP*
Leslie Bender t
INTRODUCTION
Tort law cries out for feminist insights, methodologies, criti-
ques, and reconstructions. Because tort law is mostly common law,
that is, law made by judges in response to particular cases (rather
than rules made by legislative, executive, or administrative actions),
it is flexible enough to respond quickly to feminism's critiques.
Feminist legal scholars have just begun to apply feminist theories
and methods to analyzing and "revisioning" tort law. Unfortu-
nately, work in this area is lagging behind more traditional areas of
study by feminist scholars. Feminist legal scholarship primarily has
focused on criminal laws of rape, sexual assault, battery, and de-
fenses; statutory laws against discrimination in the workplace, edu-
cation, or housing; reproductive freedom issues; combat exclusion
policies in the military; family law issues about divorce, custody, and
property divisions; constitutional issues like equality, pornography,
and hate speech; the development of feminist theories about iden-
tity, inclusion, difference, and community; and the relationships of
feminist theories to other contemporary legal theories, like ne-
opragmatism, postmodernism, critical race theories, critical legal
studies, and lesbian and gay theories.1 The rich and diverse body of
existing feminist work lays the foundation for and intersects with
scholarship in torts, but much of it cannot fairly be called torts
scholarship so as to be included in this overview. Nonetheless, re-
searchers who are interested in feminism and tort law, particularly
* Copyright © 1993 by Leslie Bender and Cornell University. All rights reserved.
t Professor of Law, Syracuse University. This overview would not exist without
the important work being done by feminist legal scholars, particularly in tort law. I
wrote this as part of the project at the University of Florida Law School to develop an
extensive bibliographic resource on women, feminist jurisprudence, and law. I worry
that this overview is unintentionally underinclusive. I hope that torts scholars will con-
tact me if I have missed any relevant feminist scholarship, so I can correct my oversights.
I am grateful to Charles Howell, Class of 1993, for his bibliographic and editorial assist-
ance on this article.
I dedicate this essay to my brother and sister-in-law, Cliff and Alice Bender of Fay-
etteville, N.C.
1 See generally FEMINIST LEGAL LITERATURE: A SELECTIVE ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
(F.C. DeCoste et al. ed., 1991); Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal
Scholarship: A Bibliography, 77 IowA L. REv. 87 (1991).
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those writing or teaching in these areas, would be negligent if they
limited themselves to only those sources included here.
Tort law provides rules that assign legal responsibility for per-
sonal injuries and that confer remedies, usually in the form of
money damages. 2 Tort law is considered private law because ac-
tions are commenced by individuals, groups of individuals, or cor-
porate bodies against other individuals or corporate bodies. Courts
award tort damages to individual plaintiffs and not to the state or
public coffers. Public law, on the other hand, often includes the
state or government as a party to the action and remedies social
concerns for the general citizenry before addressing individual con-
cerns.3 There is a great deal of overlap between public and private
law, particularly in the area of tort law, and therefore some claims,
like sexual harassment in the workplace, can fall on both sides of the
public/private law dichotomy.4 This overview focuses on private
law tort remedies and omits materials on statutory damage remedies
like Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 5 or the
MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-pornography laws which give civil reme-
dies to victims of harm caused by pornography.6
2 Examples of tort causes of action include battery, assault, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, professional malpractice, defamation, fraud,
negligence, workplace accidents (although these are usually covered by a statutory com-
pensation scheme called workers' compensation), some environmental hazards, abnor-
mally dangerous activities, products liability, trespass, and nuisance.
3 Public law includes constitutional, statutory, administrative or regulatory, and
criminal law. Feminist and critical scholars have challenged the artificiality of the pub-
lic/private distinction.
4 For a similar discussion of the public/private law overlap with respect to mass
tort law, see Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 864-868 [hereinafter Bender, Feminist
(Re)Torts].
5 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1992). Title VII, enacted as
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides back pay and equitable relief for victims of
sex-based employment discrimination. In 1986 the Supreme Court held that Title VII
covers sexual harassment in the workplace, including sexual favors in exchange for job
benefits (quid pro quo) and unwelcome sexual advances or comments that make the
environment hostile to job performance (hostile environment). Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986). Women who sued for sexual harassment in the
workplace under Title VII were not entitled to compensatory damages until 1991 when
Congress amended the act to provide compensatory, and sometimes punitive, damages
in cases of intentional discrimination, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(1) (Law. Co-op.
1986 & Supp. 1992). Compensatory damages, which are traditional tort remedies, may
now be awarded in a Title VII statutory action for "future pecuniary losses, emotional
pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other non-
pecuniary losses." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981a(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1992). The
statute specifically caps the maximum allowable compensatory and punitive awards
based on the number of persons employed by the employer. Id. No such employer-size
damage limitations exist in tort law, although some jurisdictions have statutorily enacted
damage caps for nonpecuniary and punitive awards.
6 Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin drafted an anti-pornography civil
rights law that has been enacted in several communities. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
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I have not cast a wide net in deciding what is feminist torts
scholarship. It is possible to define such scholarship broadly to in-
clude articles on tort problems that have effects on women, such as
articles about DES and Dalkon Shield litigation or articles about
torts involving reproductive issues, regardless of the positions that
the authors take in the articles. Although writing about issues that
concern women's health and safety is a feminist project, I question
whether that alone makes an article feminist. I have included in this
overview only those writings that address issues of gender power
relations, gender bias, or perspectives on law that arise from wo-
men's experiences. Feminist writings about tort law range from his-
torical and doctrinal analyses to theoretical critiques, applications of
social sciences, and innovations in teaching torts. These works will
be the focus of this overview.
I
FEMINIST HISTORIES OF TORT LAW
Martha Chamallas, with the help of historian Linda Kerber,
wrote a brilliant history of the impact of gender ideology on the law
of fright and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 7 Chamallas
and Kerber reveal that while gendered thinking affected the devel-
opment of legal doctrine about fright and emotional distress, the
gender issues remained unexamined by courts. In the early fright
cases, courts refused to allow recovery for emotional harms absent a
showing of physical impact on the plaintiff.8
These early impact-rule cases did not explicitly turn on the sex of
the plaintiff; the legal rules that emerged from the opinions were
worded neutrally. But the fright-based injuries themselves at is-
sue in the classic cases were not gender-neutral. Miscarriage, pre-
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 195-214 (1989) (describing the harm of por-
nography and the rationale for a proposed civil remedy statute); Andrea Dworkin,
Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1985)
(includes text of the Model Anti-Pornography Law in Appendix A, hereinafter "Model
Law"). After describing pornography as sex discrimination that exploits and subordi-
nates women and describing its harm, the act makes unlawful coercing a person into,
trafficking in, forcing on a person, or physically assaulting a person due to pornography.
Model Law § 3, Dworkin at 25-27. Among other remedies, the proposed statute pro-
vides that "any person aggrieved by violations of this law may enforce its provisions by
means of a civil action .... Relief for violation of this act may include reasonable attor-
ney's fees." Model Law § 5(1), Dworkin at 27. This civil action is similar to a tort action,
but created by statute instead of by common-law courts. The Seventh Circuit held that
an Indianapolis ordinance based on this statute violated the First Amendment in Ameri-
can Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.), aft'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
Nonetheless, other jurisdictions have adopted similar provisions.
7 Martha Chamallas with Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A
History, 88 MiCH. L. REv. 814 (1990).
8 Id. at 819.
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mature birth, and "hysterical" disorders described women's
health problems; the case law administering the impact rule was
necessarily the law's administration of redress for gender-related
harms. In other cases of negligently produced physical harms,
formal legal doctrine required compensation for all proximately
caused injuries. The law's treatment of fright-based harms was
much less generous. 9
Courts expressed concern that compensating plaintiffs for fright-in-
duced harms without actual physical impact would unduly burden
defendants with unpredictable liability and hold them responsible
for plaintiffs' peculiar hypersensitivities.' 0 Women's injuries, like
miscarriage, premature birth, and other fright traumas, were ad-
judged to be abnormal and hypersensitive. The dominant standard
for determining "normal" responses to fright was male.' l Even
commentators who paid attention to the gender breakdown of fright
cases made flawed assessments of what was occurring or ought to
occur in these cases.' 2
Chamallas, with Kerber, argues that the inappropriate separa-
tion of physical injury from emotional harms is related to gender
dynamics in fright cases, in which courts distinguished "physical"
harms caused by impact from "emotional" harms caused by fright.
Even though the "emotional" harms resulted in interferences with
physical integrity, like miscarriage or premature birth, they were
shunted off into a separate injury classification.13 Tort law thus
marginalized women's injuries by taking them out of the realm of
compensable physical harms. Chamallas and Kerber conclude that
"[e]motional harm has been distorted by gendering it female."' 14
They argue that cases involving the negligent infliction of emotional
distress, specifically progressive cases like Dillon v. Legg 15 that finally
reverse the "impact rule" and permit mothers to recover for emo-
tional distress from witnessing the negligently caused deaths of their
children, are really cases about women's rights because they pres-
sure the legal system to recognize and value the interests of
women.16
By producing this gendered history of negligent infliction of
emotional distress doctrine, Chamallas and Kerber "aspire . . . to
contribute to a feminist reconstruction of tort law.' 7 Not only do
9 Id. at 832.
1o Id. at 832-33.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 841-851 (criticizing the work of Leon Green and Dr. Hubert Smith).
13 Id. at 833-34.
14 Id. at 864.
15 Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
16 Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 7, at 816, 858-62.
17 Id. at 816.
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they succeed, they have established a splendid model for other femi-
nist legal scholars to follow in unearthing the gendered histories of
tort doctrine.
Likewise, Carl Tobias has written an exhaustive historical analy-
sis of interspousal tort immunity doctrine, revealing its historical
linkage to societal views of women, wives, marriage, and the fam-
ily.' 8 Interspousal tort immunity takes on special importance for
feminist legal work because it bars battered and abused wives from
proceeding with civil suits against their husbands for their intention-
ally caused harms. Tobias' research indicates how the doctrine de-
veloped in the context of women's history. Tobias argues for the
total abolition of interspousal immunity and examines how tort law
and women are affected by this change in policy. Although he dis-
cusses some possible disadvantages from the perspective of wo-
men's interests, he concludes that the benefits of abolition in
improving the quality of women's lives outweigh the detriments.
Tobias' sensitivity to the multiple ways in which family hierarchy
and traditional male dominance influence tort doctrine and will con-
tinue to affect women's lives even after the immunity's abolition in-
creases his history's value as feminist scholarship.
II
FEMINIST THEORY APPLIED TO TORT DOCTRINE
AND CONCEPTS
In 1988 1 published a very general introduction to feminist the-
ory for lawyers, showing how some aspects of that theory might af-
fect tort doctrine and analysis.19 I primarily focus on the "no duty
to rescue" doctrine and the "reasonable man/person" standard.
After arguing that the reasonable man standard, later transformed
to the reasonable person standard to be more inclusive, has histori-
cal roots in a legal system and intellectual culture that did not recog-
nize women as capable of reason, I question whether merely
changing the language from "reasonable man" to "reasonable per-
son" or using a standard expressed in terms of reason alone can
adequately represent women in tort law. 20 I suggest that it is not
reason, or even caution, but care that should be our standard. In-
18 Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359 (1989); see
also Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 45-48 (1989) (analyzing the failure of courts to address the
history of sex discrimination underlying interspousal immunity doctrine).
19 Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 3
(1988) [hereinafter Bender, Lawyer's Primer].
20 Id. at 20-25. Lucinda Finley's later published work was foundational in the devel-
opment of this critique. See Finley, supra note 18, at 57-65 (discussing gender bias in the
formulation of the "reasonable person" standard).
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stead of determining the reasonableness of defendant's actions, I
explain that courts should examine whether a defendant exhibited
adequate care for another's safety.21
If I were to rewrite that article now, I would explain more care-
fully that reason has its place in tort law, but that reason is a richer
and deeper concept than tort law has historically acknowledged.
Caring about and for others' safety and interests is part of reason-
ing, but it is a part that has been subordinated because of its
gendered identification with women. Even though the division be-
tween reason and care is a false construct, the reason/care paradigm
has been useful in feminist legal analysis to illustrate biases, hidden
assumptions, and male-centered norms within the legal system and
to suggest reconceptualizations that make law more reflective of
human experience and more responsive to concerns of justice.
A. "No Duty to Rescue"
Tort law's view of human nature as highly individualistic, auton-
omous, and self-interested has generated a "no duty to rescue" doc-
trine. This doctrine states that an actor has no duty to aid or rescue
an imperiled person even when the rescue could be performed with
no risk to the rescuer, unless the actor directly caused the peril or is
in a narrowly defined category of special relationships with the per-
son in danger. Famous cases illustrating this doctrine are taught to
most first year law students-stories of "moral monsters" who make
no effort to stop young children from being mangled by machinery
in factories 22 and business competitors who stand by and watch a
man drown in a trench on their property. 28 In challenging the no
duty rule, I rely on alternative conceptions of human nature, devel-
oped in some feminist theories, in order to transform this doctrine.
Applying a feminist ethic of care and responsibility, I argue that
"It]he recognition that we are all interdependent and connected and
that we are by nature social beings who must interact with one an-
other should lead us to judge conduct as tortious when it does not
evidence responsible care or concern for another's safety, welfare,
or health." 24 Utilizing this analysis, the "no duty" doctrine might
be transformed into a duty to exercise the "conscious care and con-
cern of a responsible neighbor or social acquaintance, ' 25 which
would impose a duty to aid or rescue within one's capacity under the
21 Bender, Lawyer's Primer, supra note 19, at 31.
22 Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898).
23 Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959).
24 Bender, Lawyer's Primer, supra note 19, at 31.
25 Id.
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FEMINIST TORTS SCHOLARSHIP
circumstances. 26 Tort law would no longer condone the inhumane
response of doing absolutely nothing to aid or rescue when one
could save another person from dying. Finally, my 1988 article ar-
gues that feminist theory encourages us to challenge traditional
modes of legal analysis and to rethink the questions we ask, includ-
ing: who are the parties involved, whose interests are protected by
tort law, what are appropriate forms of compensation, how should
we allocate responsibility for harms and risks, and what assumptions
and values underlie various tort doctrines?
B. Tort Liability Crisis
In a 1990 article I further develop some applications of feminist
theory to tort law, this time with particular attention to mass or toxic
torts. 27 After arguing that the current public outcry about the tort
liability "crisis" is primarily an orchestrated campaign by special in-
terest groups, I suggest ways in which feminist analysis might im-
prove the real flaws in our tort system, flaws that get little public
attention. The mass tort crisis, I argue, is attributable to corporate
violence and organizational self-interest rather than litigious plain-
tiffs, excessive and unruly jury verdicts, or doctrine prejudiced
against defendants. Even absent ill will and fraud, corporate vio-
lence follows from many factors: the complex organizations and hi-
erarchical structures that distance decisionmakers from
responsibilities for and connections to the harms they generate; 28
the pressures of mass production and distribution systems; priori-
ties of competitive profit-making over human health and safety; the
secrecy and lack of requirements for public disclosure of risk-crea-
tion by corporations; and, in organizations with as many employees
and as much force and power as many nations, the absence of demo-
cratic processes and accountability for decisions about nonconsen-
sual risk-imposition on different constituencies. Feminist legal
theories can influence the kinds of practices that are permissible for
large, profit-seeking corporate enterprises and change laws control-
26 Linda McClain has written extensively on the "no duty to rescue" rule in her
interesting article defending legal liberalism's core values and analysis, criticizing my
suggested analysis in the Lawyer's Primer, and yet supporting a feminist approach. Linda
C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992); see also Randy Lee, A Look at God, Feminism, and Tort Law, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 369 (1992).
27 Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts, supra note 4.
28 See KATHY E. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY (1984) (pro-
viding a feminist critique of bureaucratic and corporate hierarchical structures); see also
KATHLEEN P. IANNELLO, DECISIONS WITHOUT HIERARCHY: FEMINIST INTERVENTIONS IN
ORGANIZATION THEORY AND PRACTICE (1992) (studying feminist group organizations and
presenting a modified consensual model that avoids the distancing caused by hierarchial
structures).
1993]
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ling corporate forms, corporate decision-making, and public access
to corporate records. These changes would reduce the frequency
and quantity of mass tort litigation better than any proposed statu-
tory reforms curbing plaintiffs' abilities to recover for their losses.
C. Burdens of Proof and Presumptions in Mass Tort Law
Feminism proclaims the importance of ending power imbal-
ances stemming from systemic practices that subordinate groups of
people. Borrowing from feminist analyses of power dynamics and
the law's rhetoric about equality and justice, I suggest in my 1990
article that courts are uniquely positioned to assess resource and
information imbalances between litigants in mass tort cases. There-
fore, courts should actively intervene to balance the relative power
of the parties for purposes of the litigation. This can be accom-
plished by reallocating burdens of proof and production in mass
tort litigation and by shifting the presumption of nonliability29 from
defendant corporations (producers of the dangerous products and
risks) to plaintiffs (unsuspecting consumers, employees, or area
residents).
In such cases, if a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant
produced a product to which the plaintiff was exposed and that
there is "probable cause" to believe that the exposure caused harm,
then the defendant would be responsible for plaintiff's out-of-
pocket medical expenses and wage loss until the defendant proved
at trial that plaintiff's harm was caused by other sources. Tort law
currently allocates the presumption of nonliability for these ex-
penses in the opposite fashion. No matter how innocent the plaintiff
is, she must bear the cost of her injury and loss until she wins the
lawsuit by proving that the defendant's actions caused her harm. In
addition, plaintiff must bear the pain and life changes caused by her
injuries. Shifting the presumption of nonliability in tort law
removes some of the onerous economic burden from wrongfully in-
jured plaintiffs, although they still must bear all the pain, grief, and
inconveniences. Defendants, who have better access to scientific
studies, product development information, experts, and lawyers,
would still have an opportunity to recoup their payments for plain-
tiff's economic loss by proving that other factors caused the plain-
tiff's injuries. By redressing the resource and power imbalance,
29 Under the presumption of nonliability, a defendant is not legally responsible for
the economic consequences of an injury before there has been an adjudication of liabil-
ity or responsibility. In litigation today, injured parties are presumed economically re-
sponsible or liable for their own injuries unless they can prove that the defendant caused
the harm. Defendants are presumptively not liable or responsible, hence the presump-
tion of nonliability lies with them, unless plaintiffs can prove they caused the harm.
[Vol. 78:575
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these suggested tort law rules would help realize the feminist goal of
eliminating subordination caused by socially created power dynam-
ics, while moving closer to the ideal of equality before the law.
D. Tort Remedies
The work of Carol Gilligan30 has been influential for feminist
legal theorists studying law's narrow value structure and its failure
to represent the full depth of thinking, feeling, and acting in our
society. Gilligan's feminist scholarship offers an ethic of care and
responsibility to complement traditional ethics of rights and justice.
Feminist understandings of responsibility and interconnectedness
can enrich how we think about legal responsibility.3 ' Although pay-
ing money damages is equivalent to taking partial responsibility for
harm, it has erroneously paraded as the full meaning of responsibil-
ity in law. A standard of legal responsibility that includes interper-
sonal caregiving more closely reflects the experiences and
understandings of people routinely responsible for one another.
Such an expansion of our concept of responsibility would improve
tort law by making corporate decisionmakers personally responsible
for the consequences of their decisions, thus humanizing corpora-
tions and their activities. Rethinking remedies and procedures for
mass tort litigation applies feminist theory in ways that create signif-
icant changes in the balance of power among litgants and in the core
values of tort law.
E. Injury or Harm in Tort Law
Adrian Howe, Joyce McConnell, and Lucinda Finley are leaders
in thinking about tort law's understanding of injury or harm. Adrian
Howe proposes a shift from the conventional tort idea of individual-
ized, privatized injury to a concept of social injury for women.3 2 Be-
cause gender bias affects all women, injuries to women are both
individual and class-based. Law must be able to respond simultane-
ously to both aspects of a single harmful act. Howe helps us think
about how to implement this change. She traces the concept of so-
cial injury through Catharine MacKinnon's work on rape, sexual
harassment and pornography, and through the idea of social injury
30 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); MAKING CONNECTIONS (Carol
Gilligan et al. eds., 1990); MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988).
31 Treated in full in Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts, supra note 4, at 901-08, these ideas
about responsibility and caregiving are also summarized in Leslie Bender, Changing the
Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA LJ. 759 (1990).
32 ADRIAN HOWE, THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATIZED INJURIES: FEMINIST STRATEGIES FOR
LITIGATION (Institute for Legal Studies Working Paper No. 4:1, 1989); see also MARTHA A.
FINEMAN & NANCY S. THOMADSEN, AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAw: FEMINISM AND LEGAL
THEORY 148 (1991).
1993] 583
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
in criminology, which, she argues, is analogous to civil social injury.
Howe offers her "social injury strategy as an affirmation of [her]
faith in the progressive possibilities of feminist interventions in
law." 33 She urges feminist scholars to demonstrate that social injury
is part of a gender-ordered legal system. Questions arise whether
this can be accomplished within common law tort, or so exceeds tort
law's traditional private law base as to be an issue for public law
remedies. Feminist arguments about the artificial dichotomy be-
tween public and private law are particularly apt here.3 4 Such argu-
ments indicate the need for either an integration of public and
private law in these cases or a category sui generis for injuries suffered
by individuals because they are women. 35
F. Harms From Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse
Joyce McConnell, the feminist torts scholar who has most
clearly heeded Howe's call, is studying tort remedies for incest sur-
vivors. In her first article on the subject, 36 she explores the fallacy
of categorizing incest as either public or private harm, because it is
both. By focusing on the case of Laurie Marie M. v. Jeffrey T.M., 37 she
shows that even when courts acknowledge the social context of in-
cest and assess liability in an individual case, they fail to account for
social harm in calculating damages. Despite a jury verdict awarding
Laurie Marie M. $200,000 compensatory and $275,000 punitive
damages, the intermediate appellate court remitted both awards to
$100,000 each, and further diminished the significance of the harm
by characterizing it as "purely private." McConnell argues that it is
"folly [to] attempt to situate intrafamilial sexual abuse exclusively
on one side of the private/public dichotomy, since incest contains
elements of both." 38
Despite the difficulties in educating courts about the dichotomy
misconception, McConnell encourages the continued use of tort law
because it
offer[s] the injured plaintiff a different kind of satisfaction from
that derived through a criminal prosecution. For the victim of in-
33 FINEMAN & THOMADSEN, supra note 32, at 166.
34 For an overview of the public-private, and individual-collective aspects of tort
remedies, see Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts, supra note 4, at 864-72.
35 In an exciting work in progress, SuzanneJ. Levitt is "Rethinking Harm" from a
feminist perspective with particular emphasis on torts, employment discrimination, and
topical themes of the public/private dichotomy, the "make whole" concept of damages,
coercion/consent, and the effect of the background noise of oppression on law's under-
standing of injury (detailed proposal on file with author).
36 Joyce McConnell, Incest As Conundrum: Judicial Discourse on Private Wrong and Public
Harm, 1 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 143 (1992).
37 559 N.Y.S.2d 336 (App. Div. 1990), aft'd, 575 N.E.2d 393 (N.Y. 1991).
38 McConnell, supra note 36, at 144-45.
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trafamilial sexual abuse, a tort suit offers the opportunity to be the
court's central concern rather than merely a peripheral subject of
the defendant's criminal conduct. It offers the victim the opportu-
nity to tell of her suffering, be believed by a jury and vindicate her
experience through the award of damages. 39
In a soon-to-be published second essay, McConnell proposes the
use of a class action or mass tort model to acknowledge the social
injury of incest.40 Her analysis is a powerful illustration of feminist
contributions to the reconstruction of tort law. Incest survivors,
without having to rely on a district attorney to respond, would be
able to call both perpetrators and society to account for the harms
caused by this all too prevalent practice rooted in patriarchal
domination.
G. Undercompensation of Women's Harms
For many years, Lucinda Finley has been thinking, writing, and
publicly speaking about how tort law fails to understand harms to
women.41 In her only published article focusing solely on torts, she
richly illustrates the influence of gender bias on the development of
tort doctrines such as intrafamilial immunity, loss of consortium,
rules about assessing damages, and sexual harassment.42 For exam-
ple, Finley begins by discussing how doctrines like interspousal tort
immunity or the privilege of discipline remove intentional marital
injuries from the tort system altogether and force women plaintiffs
into the criminal or family court systems, where no monetary dam-
ages were available.
Turning to wrongful death actions, Finley argues that courts
fail to compensate women for the real and substantial harms that
they suffer when their children are negligently killed because dam-
ages are frequently limited to pecuniary losses. Finley notes that
injuries to children disproportionately affect mothers because their
female parenting role closely links self-identity with caretaking du-
ties and children's well-being.43 She asks tort scholars and students
to consider whether tort law should compensate for relational and
emotional injuries as well as out-of-pocket expenses and future eco-
nomic loss. In addition, Finley advances feminist legal theory enor-
39 Id. at 172.
40 Joyce McConnell, Refusing to be Victims: Postmodern Possibilities of Tort Law
(unpublished presentation, 1992 Law and Society Annual Meeting, Phila., Pa.).
41 It is unfortunate that Finley's talks on the topic are not published. For those
readers who have missed hearing her, I recommend searching for audio tapes of Associ-
ation of American Law Schools, Law and Society, and Critical Legal Studies conferences
since about 1986.
42 Finley, supra note 18.
43 Id. at 50-5 1.
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mously by arguing that tort law has failed to adequately value
homemaker and caretaking services. 44 Traditional damage calcula-
tions rely on gender stereotypes and systemic gender bias to skew
and underestimate projections of future income women would earn
in the market.
Sexual injury cases further reveal the undervaluation of wo-
men's injuries. 45 Bruce Feldthusen's recent study is a powerful in-
dictment of the Canadian legal system's failure to adequately
quantify damages for sexual battery and discrimination. 46 His femi-
nist analysis contends that undercompensation occurs because
courts ignore relevant differences between other kinds of cases and
sexual battery cases, while emphasizing irrelevant differences. Both
moves significantly disadvantage women victims. Damages in sexual
battery cases may also be lower because monetary compensation is
not always the primary motivation for women who bring these law-
suits; instead, they may sue to punish the assailant, or to achieve
corrective justice, public vindication, and the cathartic, healing ef-
fect of the litigation itself. Nonetheless, Feldthusen makes a com-
pelling cases for pecuniary damages for lost earning capacity and
past and future psychological counselling, as well as for nonpecu-
niary and punitive damages. He urges courts "to recognize fully
'gender-specific' pain when quantifying non-pecuniary loss... [en-
couraging them to] focus less on the conduct of the perpetrator and
more on the injury to the victim."' 47 Feldthusen calls on the judicial
system to account for its perpetuation of gender discrimination and
bias.
H. Failure to Include Women's Experiences in Legal
Standards
Finley also challenges law to enlarge its context of analysis by
including more of women's experiences. She exposes the gender
bias in the reasonable person standard, 48 through cogent analyses
44 A recent study of wrongful death awards strongly supports Finley's claims about
the need to value homemaker services. See Goodman et al., infra note 95 (discussing
gender-based differences in civil damage awards); see also Elaine Gibson, The Gendered
Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages, in TORT THEORY 185 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson &
Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); REGINA GRAYCAR &JENNY MORGAN, THE HIDDEN GENDER OF
LAw 74-91 (1990); Regina Graycar, Women's Work: Who Cares?, 14 SYDNEY L. REV. 86
(1992); Regina Graycar, Love's Labour's Cost. The High Court Decision in Van Gervan v.
Fenton, I TORTS LJ. (forthcoming 1993).
45 See McConnell, supra note 36, at 146-52.
46 Bruce Feldthusen, Discriminatory Damage Quantification in Civil Actions for Sexual Bat-
tery, - U. TORONTO LJ. - (forthcoming 1993).
47 Id. at -. Throughout his work he cites to Kate Sutherland, Measuring Pain:
Quantifying Damages in Civil Suits for Sexual Assault, in TORT THEORY, supra note 44, at 212.
48 Finley, supra note 18, at 57-65.
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of a sexual harassment case, Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. ,49 and a
DES statute of limitations case, O'Brien v. Eli Lilly and Co. 50 Finley
uses these cases to illustrate the fallacy of applying a "neutral" rea-
sonable person standard, which, in these particular contexts is actu-
ally biased and insensitive to the perspectives and experiences of
women. 51 Finely's current work-in-progress is an important empiri-
cal and theoretical book that further elaborates this concept. She
reconceptualizes the meaning of harm in DES cases5 2 and proposes
a method for evaluting damage claims asserted by DES daughters.
She has interviewed many DES daughters to determine how they
characterize their harms and how they understand what would justly
compensate them. Finley concludes that tort law does not ade-
quately address the seriousness and consequences of injuries to wo-
men's reproductive systems-very physical injuries that are
frequently characterized as emotional 53-and damages inflicted
upon their senses of self. Finley's and Feldthusen's works will un-
doubtedly help courts and practitioners do a betterjob of relating to
women plaintiffs' actual experiences of harm and assessing fair com-
pensation for these injuries.
I. Causation and Time in Tort Law
Applying feminist methods and analyses, Ann Scales argues
that law's concepts of time, space, and causality are narrowly rigid,
linear, and "white male." 54 Borrowing from the work of French
feministJulia Kristeva55 and Native American cultures,56 Scales sug-
gests that women have a different sense of causality and time-one
that is multiple, contingent, repetitive, and cyclical. 57 She demon-
strates the differences in male and female perceptions of time by
49 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
50 668 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981) (as amendedJan. 5, 1982).
51 Finley, supra note 18, at 57-65. See also Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1398, 1404-06 (1992).
52 Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is an estrogen-based drug that was frequently prescribed
to pregnant women between the 1950s and early 1970s. Children exposed to DES in
utero developed serious reproductive tract deformities and injuries, including a deadly
signature cervical and vaginal cancer, clear cell adenoma. Most of those injured in utero
were female children, hence the references to "DES daughters."
53 This is analogous to claims that Chamallas and Kerber made about women's real
physical harms being labelled "emotional" and treated differently from other types of
harms. See Chamallas with Kerber, supra note 7, at 814.
54 Ann C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. REv. 95, 98-99 (1990) This
insightful article is a prelude to a book she is currently writing. It will be a great boost to
feminist legal scholarship in tort if Scales expands on her ideas focusing on tort analysis.
55 Julia Kristeva, Women's Time, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y 13 (Alice
Jardine & Harry Blake trans., 1981).
56 Scales, supra note 54, at 109 n.49, 121.
57 Id. at 109-10, 120.
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comparing battered women's experiences of time and causation in
anticipating further assaults with the traditional self-defense re-
quirement of "imminent harm." To illustrate the differences be-
tween linear and multiple causality, Scales utilizes mass tort cases
such as Agent Orange, DES, and the Utah atomic bomb radiation
fallout cases. Mass torts do not fit neatly into the traditional legal
linear sense of causation. Legal cause inquiries are complicated by
"the problem of imperfect data, the problem of infinite causal predi-
cates, and the problem of social causation."5 8 According to Scales,
women and other previously excluded groups will be instrumental
in bringing about a paradigm shift in the understanding of legal cau-
sation.59 Although Scales recognizes that there will be great resist-
ance to recognizing the fluidity of causation, she finds that including
alternative perceptions is essential to preserve human dignity60 and
to promote the progress of tort law. Causation analysis, a pivotal
issue in tort law, calls out for more work by feminist legal theorists.
J. Critiquing Neocontractual Tort Theories
Peter Bell has written a thoughtful, detailed appraisal of a re-
cent development in tort theory-neocontractarian analysis. 6' Ne-
ocontractual legal theory postulates that tort rules and damages are
based on a hypothetical bargain that would have been agreed to by
the litigants. Applying insights gained from feminist theories, Bell
concludes that neocontract fails to give proper care and respect to
the individuals whom it purports to honor.62 Neocontract places
undue reliance on autonomy and abstraction 63 and fails to take into
account the experiences and needs of the injured victims. 64 Bell
recommends a more relational and cooperative understanding of
human interactions than that offered by neocontract. 65 Bell argues
that tort law should utilize alternative theories that empower con-
sumers and tort victims rather than the injurers, whose choices are
maximized by neocontractual analysis. 66 Finally, Bell faults neocon-
tract for failing to acknowledge the socially valuable aspects of tort
law: increased safety, increased availability of choices and informa-
58 Id. at 117.
59 Acknowledgement of women's causality "has the additional virtue of embracing
mystery." Id. at 121. In an intriguing paragraph, Scales suggests the torts of "insult to
mystery" and "ecological arrogance." Id.
60 Id. at 123.
61 Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 1177 (1990).
62 Id. at 1180.
63 Id. at 1205-11.
64 Id. at 1211-15.
65 Id. at 1207-09.
66 Id. at 1215-21.
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tion for consumers, and internalization of some costs of injury by
producers. 67 Bell's work is especially important because he is one of
the few traditional torts scholars who use the work and insights of
feminist legal scholars to complement their own theorizing and
research.
III
FEMINIST THEORY APPLIED TO TEACHING TORTS
Feminist tort theorists have also written and spoken about
teaching torts. For example, the Lucinda Finley article mentioned
earlier, is designed to teach torts professors how to include feminist
concerns and analyses in their courses.68 She discusses cases which
can be used to reveal gender bias and doctrines particularly amena-
ble to feminist critique. Finley also suggests changes in tort law,
especially with regard to the standard of care, sexual harassment
doctrine, and the valuation of homemaker services and women's in-
juries. Her work encourages torts professors to begin to make their
courses more inclusive. 69
Carl Tobias approaches teaching torts by analyzing gender bias
in a very popular torts casebook.70 Following the methodology de-
veloped and utilized by Professor Mary Joe Frug to examine a con-
tracts casebook,7 ' Tobias examines the treatment of women as
characters, the gendered language, and the organization of cases
and materials. He then discusses the "maleness" of the casebook,
including the fact that all of the book's illustrations of legal heroes,
torts scholars, and judges are male. 72 Tobias also asserts that infor-
mation about women's history and issues of great significance to wo-
men are often arranged poorly or excluded altogether. 73 In the last
half of his article, Tobias analyzes gender issues that arise in the
casebook's intentional tort materials. While he rarely finds in-
67 Id. at 1237-46.
68 Finley, supra note 18.
69 At the 1993 Women and the Law Project annual meeting in San Francisco,
Professors Jean Love and Okianer Christian Dark offered lists of tort cases useful for
teaching intentional torts and harassment; see also audio presentations of Professors
Phoebe Haddon and Tauyna L. Banks at the October 1992 AALS Workshop for Minor-
ity Law Teachers in Washington, D.C. For further help in eliminating sex bias in law
school courses, see Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues,
38J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (1988).
70 Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1988).
71 Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34
AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985). Similary, Mary Coombs has evaluated a criminal law text
from a feminist perspective. Mary I. Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or a Tale of a Text: A
Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988).
72 Tobias, supra note 70, at 506-08.
73 Id. at 508.
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stances of overt sexism, Tobias exposes subtler forms of gender
bias. Intentional torts implicate power, and thus are an ideal forum
for identifying and rectifying relative imbalances of power. Tobias
demonstrates how the casebook, which omits cases on potential in-
tentional torts such as sexual harassment, inadequately addresses
this dimension.7 4 He concludes by recommending changes in the
book's next edition and by suggesting methods for teaching from
the book.
IV
TORT ISSUES IMPORTANT TO WOMEN'S LIVES
Many torts articles discuss issues important to women's lives,
such as reproductive torts, sexual harassment, intrafamilial violence
and products that have harmed women, such as DES, Dalkon Shield,
and oral contraceptives. In this section, I will examine feminist ap-
proaches that focus on women's experiences and protect women by
providing tort remedies or protect them from being sued. During
the early 1980s, feminist authors, like Gail Ballou, 75 Camille
LeGrand, and Frances Leonard 76 proposed ways to use the tort sys-
tem to compensate survivors of rape and sexual assault. Although
criminal law may result in the incarceration of a rapist, the survivor
must resort to a private law remedy to recover damages for physical
and emotional harm, as well as her pecuniary losses. Camille W.
Cook and Pamela Kirkwood Millsaps, 77 Margaret Allen, 78 Christine
Cleary, 79 and Melissa Salten8s all argue for tort remedies for incest
survivors, despite problems with statutes of limitations, repressed
memories, and questions about insurance coverage. After docu-
menting the social contexts of physical assaults on women and argu-
ing for mandatory arrest policies, Caroline Forell analyzes cases and
experiences dealing with tort liability for police officers who fail to
74 Id. at 518-9. Tobias faults the casebook for using quotes to illustrate that "mere
solicitation of a woman to illicit intercourse" does not state a cause of action and that
"there is no harm in asking," but does not raise questions about the effects of power
relations on intentional torts, such as sexual harassment of students by faculty or em-
ployees by supervisors. Id. at 519.
75 Gail M. Ballou, Recourse for Rape Victims: Third Party Liability, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S
LJ. 105 (1981).
76 Camille LeGrand & Frances Leonard, Civil Suits for Sexual Assault: Compensating
Rape Victims, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 479 (1979).
77 Camille W. Cook & Pamela K. Millsaps, Redressing Wrongs of the Blamelessly Ignorant
Survivor of Incest, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
78 Margaret J. Allen, Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 609 (1983).
79 Christine Cleary, Comment, Litigating Incest Torts Under Homeowner's Insurance Poli-
ies, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 539 (1988).
80 Melissa G. Salten, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's
Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1984).
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assist battered women.8 1 Denise LeBoeuf and Laurie Morin explore
tort issues and remedies for female patients exploited by their ther-
apists.8 2 Thomas Lyon and Caroline Forell examine the sexual mis-
conduct of lawyers with female clients.83 Krista Schoenheider,8 4
Benson Wolman,8 5 Alice Montgomery,8 6 and Sarah Wald8 7 theorize
about tort liability (independent of, or in addition to, Title VII rem-
edies) as a means to recover for sexual harassment and employment
discrimination in the workplace.88 Regina Austin and Jean Love
81 Caroline Forell, Stopping the Violence: Mandatory Arrest and Police Tort Liability for
Failure to Assist Battered Women, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 215 (1990-91). Both Caroline
Forell and Laura Harper recognize the difficulty posed for women in bringing constitu-
tional tort actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.
of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see also Laura S. Harper, Note, Battered Women Suing
Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1393 (1990). The DeShaney case held
that the Department of Social Services was not liable for failing to protect a battered
child from his father, despite the fact that Social Services had ample evidence about the
child's abuse and failed to follow-up adequately. There was no constitutionally based
violation because social services employees were not the parties causing the injury-that
is, they did not act affirmatively, they merely failed to act. The Supreme Court in
DeShaney acknowledged that there might be a tort action but found that there was no
constitutional protection. For an analysis of police failure to assist prior to DeShaney, see
Ruth Gundle, Civil Liability for Police Failure to Arrest: Nearing v. Weaver, 9 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 259 (1986).
82 Denise LeBoeuf, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11 HARV.
WOMEN'S LJ. 83 (1988); Laurie A. Morin, Civil Remedies for Therapist-Patient Sexual Ex-
ploitation, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 401 (1989).
83 Caroline Forell, Lawyers, Clients and Sex: Breaking the Silence on the Ethical and Liabil-
ity Issues, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 611 (1992); Thomas Lyon, Note, Sexual Exploitation
of Divorce Clients: The Lawyer's Prerogative?, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 159 (1987) (analyzing
from a feminist perspective the unequal power and emotional instability of divorce cli-
ents and recommending both professional disciplinary action and direct tort liability).
Both of these articles use the famous case of Barbara A. v.John G., 145 Cal. App.3d 369
(1983), as a starting point.
84 KristaJ. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461 (1986).
85 Benson A. Wolman, Comment, Verbal Sexual Harassment on the Job as Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 17 CAP. U. L. REV. 245 (1988).
86 Alice Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort
Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 879, 888-911 (1980) (recommending the use of torts
like assault and battery, intentional interference with contract, and fraud and deceit to
remedy workplace sexual harassment).
87 Sarah E. Wald, Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and Common-Law Remedies for
Employment Discrimination, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1982) (emphasizing intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress and recommending new cause of action under state unfair
or deceptive practices acts).
88 But see Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control,
3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 303-04 (1991)(recommending an amendment to Title VII
instead of using tort actions as a remedy to sexual harassment). Catharine MacKinnon's
work was foundational in naming sexual harassment as a harm and getting it included
under Title VII. CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, thus permitting compensatory damages for emotional distress and
other harms from sexual harassment in some cases. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981a(a)(1).
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write about using the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress to recover for hate speech and employer abuses based on race,
gender, and class discrimination.8 9
Other interesting articles consider the relationship of tort law
to reproductive rights and injuries. Karen Bussel uses women's au-
tonomy as the basis for her strong feminist argument for the prohi-
bition of tort liability for gestational surrogate mothers engaged in
lawful behavior. 90 Patricia Quintilian discusses the use of informed
consent doctrine to respond to the increasing numbers of unneces-
sary hysterectomies performed on women. 91 In support of women's
access to nurse-midwives during childbirth, Donna M. Peizer argues
for the elimination of vicarious liability for physicians, with limited
exceptions. 92 She notes that history reveals women's loss of control
over childbirth, 93 and that the fear of vicarious liability among doc-
tors "poses one of the most formidable obstacles to full utilization
of nurse-midwives. . . -94 These examples indicate the range of
ways that feminist legal scholars write about tort issues that affect
women.
V
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN FEMINISM AND TORT LAW
Jane Goodman, Elizabeth Loftus, Marian Miller, and Edith
Greene have studied the effects of gender bias and stereotypes on
wrongful death damages.95 After reviewing past research on gender
bias in civil jury awards of monetary damages and analyzing data
from the Washington State Task Force on the Economic Conse-
quences of Gender in Civil Litigation Study, the authors generated
their own data by conducting a simulated wrongful death jury study.
In addition to jury verdict amounts, Goodman and her colleagues
collected written statements from sample jurors explaining how
they determined an appropriate sum of damages. The article con-
89 Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988);Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the
Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123 (1990); see also
Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (discussing tort actions for hate speech).
90 Karen A. Bussel, Note, Adventures in Babysitting: Gestational Surrogate Mother Tort
Liability, 41 DUKE LJ. 661 (1991).
91 Patricia Quintilian, Comment, Unnecessary Hysterectomy: The Lack of Informed Con-
sent, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 573 (1983).
92 Donna M. Peizer, A Social and Legal Analysis of the Independent Practice of Midwifery:
Vicarious Liability of the Collaborating Physician and Judicial Means ofAddressing Denial of Hospi-
tal Privileges, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 139 (1986).
93 Id. at 141.
94 Id. at 171.
95 Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage
Awards, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 263 (1991).
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tains tables of data and excerpted juror commentaries. This re-
search reveals that a "double standard" persists in jury awards for
wrongful death depending upon the sex of the decedent. The au-
thors conclude that "it can be traced most directly to stereotypes
about employment remuneration, based on longstanding discrimi-
nation against women in the workplace" and to "strong stereotypes
about male and female roles in the home." 96 To reduce gender bias
favoring males, they suggest the use of experts to inform juries
about the reasonable value of household services, regardless of
whether wages were actually paid. There is a wealth of opportunity
for future feminist social science research about tort law cases, out-
comes, practices, and harms.
VI
BOOK REVIEWS
Some feminist theorists have published book reviews of torts
books or used torts examples in their reviews. In a review of Ste-
phen Sugarman's book about tort law,9 7 Stephanie Wildman reflects
on the feminist implications of Sugarman's tort law proposals. 98
Sugarman has suggested eliminating tort law in general and substi-
tuting a compensation system funded jointly by employers and the
Social Security system. Wildman, while generally open to his sug-
gestions, worries that his proposal to end tort recovery, and thus
end compensation for nonpecuniary losses (other than a capped
damage maximum for pain and suffering), devalues emotional and
relational losses. She questions the wisdom of Sugarman's ap-
proach in a society that measures value in terms of money. 99
Wildman's feminist perspective is also apparent in her criticism of
Sugarman's proposals as "institutionaliz[ing] the invisibility of
nonearner work"' 00 and for his assumption that all homemakers are
attached to someone in the workforce.
In her review of Catharine MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory
of the State,' 10 Wildman uses tort examples to support MacKinnon's
thesis that law and the legal system are gendered male and do not
take seriously the abuse of women by men.10 2 Wildman argues that
in famous tort cases such as Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of Cali-
96 Id. at 281-82.
97 STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989).
98 Stephanie M. Wildman, Enlightened Social Insurance in a World Made Safer, 44 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 877 (1990).
99 Id. at 890.
100 Id. at 891.
101 MACKINNON, supra note 6.
102 Stephanie M. Wildman, Review Essay: The Power of Women, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
435 (1990).
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fornia, 10 3 Riss v. City of New York, 10 4 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,10 5 and
Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp.,106 the courts ignored or marginalized the
issue of the abuse of women. She also questions whether the gen-
der of the victims in other famous cases like Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co. 10 7 and Dillon v. Legg108 influenced their outcomes. By
applying MacKinnon's analysis to tort cases, Wildman bolsters the
power of MacKinnon's critique about male biases in law masquerad-
ing in language of objectivity and neutrality.
Ellen Smith Pryor uses feminist analysis to review A. Engel-
berg's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Injury, published by the
American Medical Association. 109 Although these Guides have been
adopted by many states as a standard for determining workers' com-
pensation benefits, Pryor argues that "the Guides' flawed promises of
objectivity are especially troubling because they appeal to the crav-
ing of legislators and other decisionmakers for certainty and clarity
in the difficult arena of impairment and disability assessment."' 110
She cites numerous examples from the Guides that reveal gender bi-
ases in assumptions about activities and abilities of injured women
that negatively influence their whole-person impairment ratings. "'1
In addition, Pryor notes that gender bias is embedded in the guide-
lines which address injuries to the reproductive system. These
guidelines omit consideration of a woman's loss of sexual sensation
(whereas a man's is taken into account) and allow individual physi-
cians to incorporate their own subjective, often stereotypical, views
103 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976) (involving the fatal stabbing of a female student by a
crazed ex-boyfriend who was under psychological treatment and had informed his thera-
pist that he was going to kill her).
104 22 N.Y.2d 579, (1968) (Woman sued city for failing to provide her with adequate
police protection, despite her multiple requests for help after she received threats by a
rejected suitor. The threats were actualized when he hired someone to throw lye in her
face, causing her to be permanently scarred and blinded.).
105 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980) (Daughters of women who took the prescription drug DES
during pregnancy sued multiple manufacturers of DES to seek compensation for their
cervical cancers caused by effects of the drug while they were in utero.).
106 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970) (Female child with history of sexual abuse became
schizophrenic after car accident and sued other driver for damages including her schizo-
phrenia, which she claimed was caused by the accident.).
107 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) (Woman who was injured by a railroad employee's negli-
gence, which caused a fireworks explosion in a train station, was found to be an unfore-
seeable plaintiff and ineligible for recovery.).
108 68 Cal.2d 728 (1968) (Mother entitled to recover for emotional distress caused
by witnessing the negligently caused death of her child.).
109 Ellen S. Pryor, Flawed Promises: A Critical Evaluation of the American Medical Associa-
tion's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 964 (1990).
110 Id. at 965.
111 Id. at 970. Levels of appropriate compensation are established through evalua-
tions of the degree of impairment suffered by the whole person and indicated in part by
alterations in the activities of daily living.
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into the "activities of daily living" measurement for impairment.' 12
Pryor explains that the Guides should be more explicit about their
underlying choices and criteria for compensation in order to pre-
vent the physicians' subjective assumptions about women from dic-
tating compensation standards. 1 3
Jean Love and Patricia Cain, in their review of Judith Jarvis
Thomson's book on moral theory, 114 suggest that Thomson's hy-
potheticals are useful for teaching torts classes.' 15 Thomson, a phi-
losopher, develops unique hypothetical situations to test theories
about moral rights. Love notes analogies between Thomson's hy-
potheticals and the rights protected by tort law, the laws of self-de-
fense, and public and private necessity doctrine. While the tort
section of Love's review is not explicitly feminist, it is combined with
other sections that suggest a feminist approach to using Thomson's
materials in the classroom." 16
VII
OVERVIEWS
While chairing the Association of American Law Schools Sec-
tion on Torts, Jean Love wrote a brief overview of recent feminist
scholarship in torts and offered suggestions about materials that
might be included in a torts course.1 17 She also began compiling a
list of cases and materials useful in teaching torts from this new per-
spective.I"' Unfortunately, no other overviews of available cases or
feminist writings in tort exist.
CONCLUSION
Feminist theorists have made inroads in rethinking and critiqu-
ing tort theory, but much more needs to be done. Feminist legal
scholars have taken insights from feminist scholarship in other disci-
plines and from feminist methods in general to criticize and recon-
ceive tort's precarious position as a private law remedy for
individual harms. In doing so, they have unearthed tort law's gen-
112 Id. at 970-71.
113 Id. at 971-73.
114 JUDITH J. THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION & RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY
(William Parent ed., 1986).
115 Patricia A. Cain & Jean C. Love, Stories of Rights: Developing Moral Theory and
Teaching Law, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1365 (1988).
116 See, in particular, Pat Cain's discussion on using Judith Thomson's work in her
feminist legal theory class. Id. at 1378-87.
117 Jean C. Love, Torts and Retorts-Bringing Gender Issues Into the Torts Course, Newslet-
ter, Association of American Law Schools, Section on Torts-Compensation Systems
(Fall 1989).
118 Jean C. Love, Teaching Torts: A New Perspective-Selected Cases and Articles
(Jan. 1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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der biases, tested its value system, and added to its causes of action.
Not only do we need more feminist legal theorists to question tradi-
tional tort law's approach to causation, harm, fault, and legal re-
sponsibility, we also need more feminists to translate women's
experiences of harm into legal claims that will result in compensa-
tion. Feminists need to rethink tort defenses as well.
Feminist tort theorists ought to question the ways in which we
organize torts analysis, challenge the values of tort law, suggest new
paradigms for resolving personal injury problems, assess compensa-
tion systems for systemic bias, and help alleviate the huge human
cost of personal injuries in our society. Feminist lawyers and schol-
ars need to evaluate tort litigation strategies and seek alternatives to
litigation that protect vulnerable parties and achieve just, prompt
resolutions of injury cases. Scores of tort doctrines and analytic
concepts remain unexamined, leaving their gender, race, class, and
sexuality biases to be unconsciously reproduced in the next genera-
tion of cases and lawyers. Feminist legal scholars have their work
cut out for them in the area of tort law.
Law schools need torts casebooks with feminist perspectives,
or, at a minimum, books that include feminist materials." 19 Feminist
law professors must share their experiences and insights about im-
proving methods of teaching about personal injuries and sensitizing
students to all of the dynamics involved in these situations. There is
a dearth of materials exploring the intersections of race, class,
ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, age, and gender in personal
injury situations. This work must be done.
Feminist scholars need to write articles for traditional torts
teachers, enabling them to expand the perspectives in their courses.
Feminist tort teachers also need more materials containing feminist
analyses of tort to give to students. The work that has been done is
pathbreaking. The work yet to be done will determine the future
benefits of tort law for women.
1 19 A recent Australian casebook has made steps in the right direction. HAROLD
LUNTz & DAVID HAMBLY, TORTS: CASES AND COMMENTARY (3d ed. 1992). See also TORT
THEORY, supra note 44.
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